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Vladimir Putin’s announcement to run for another term makes him the most durable 
leader in Russia’s recent history. Some think of Putin as “the new Brezhnev” who may die in 
office many years from now. But is it fair to compare Putin to Leonid Brezhnev? Can the Soviet 
past provide any lessons for Russia’s present and future? What should the United States expect 
of Putin?  
The comparison between Brezhnev and Putin reveals more differences than similarities. 
Brezhnev, who stayed in power for eighteen years, owed his whole political career to the ruling 
communist party. He had lived through the age of revolution and war, and perhaps for this reason 
yearned for stability, order and relaxation. His foreign policy was conservative. His personal 
insecurity and experience of the Second World War made Brezhnev feel that the Soviet Union, 
one of the two superpowers, was a major stakeholder in global stability, and should seek to 
prevent a major war.  
Brezhnev inherited the giant territorial empire and the bloc of allied socialist countries. 
He knew that Soviet empire was vulnerable and feared a domino-effect. He said after the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: “If we had not disrupted the plans of counterrevolution in 
Czechoslovakia, NATO troops would soon end up immediately on our Western 
borders.” 1Brezhnev believed that the accumulation of military power was a precondition for 
Soviet role and place in the world. At the same time, he realized that the Soviet Union could not 
win a race against the United States, and loathed Khrushchev’s brinkmanship, that had led to the 
                                                     
1 L. Brezhnev, speech at the Plenary Meeting, December 15, 1969, 
http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/almanah/inside/almanah-doc/1014781, accessed February 5, 2018,  
crises over Berlin and Cuba. Instead of continuing with the Cold War, Brezhnev wanted to reach 
a grand bargain with the United States, another major stakeholder of global stability. The US-
Soviet detente, Brezhnev hoped, would solve many problems, including access to Western 
technology, economic development and better living standards for Soviet people. Brezhnev 
vision of peace was not Kantian and liberal, but quite genuine.  
Brezhnev’s view of the United States was more pragmatic than ideological. The parity of 
nuclear forces, in this view, would make the US leaders recognize the Soviet Union as equal; 
then a new world order could be constructed jointly by the two superpowers. The diplomacy of 
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger seemed to validate Brezhnev’s view. Yet, détente peaked 
after just a few good years and began to decline. Brezhnev’s vision revealed itself as a naïve 
illusion. Instead of cooperating, the superpowers skirmished in the Third World and over human 
rights. And instead of an alliance with the Soviet Union, the United States preferred an alliance 
with the communist China. The mirage of the US-Soviet rapprochement faded just as Brezhnev’s 
health failed. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan can be considered more an effect, rather than a 
cause of the end of détente.  
Vladimir Putin was a young KGB officer during that era, but his real formative political 
experience came with the collapse communism and Soviet statehood. Putin fully accepted the 
failure of communism as economic and ideological doctrine. In contrast to Brezhnev, who 
believed in the status quo, Putin learned to survive in an era of high volatility, in the new world 
that emerged after 1991. He saw his mission above all to restore the Russian state. He is 
succeeding only in part: instead of the mighty communist party, he runs a rickety and conflicting 
coalition of corrupt and greedy security forces, sprawling bureaucracies, export-oriented 
oligarchic capitalists, xenophobic Orthodox Church leaders, Russian nationalists, and Chechnya 
strongmen. Putin is an autocrat on a tightrope. His credibility and leadership strongly depend on 
popular approval, and he is paranoid about Western interference into Russian presidential 
elections.  
Putin acknowledges that the old Soviet empire cannot and should not be rebuilt. Russia is 
simply too weak for this: the Russian economy is ten times smaller than the U.S. economy, and 
so are Russian military expenditures. In Putin’s vision, Russia should remain an autonomous 
power between the European Union and China. To maintain this position and compensate for its 
weakness, Russia needs a strong authoritarian regime. It is Putin’s firm conviction that 
experiments with liberalization and democracy would only lead to Russia’s destabilization and 
possible collapse.  
Putin recognized the central role of the United States in the post-1991 order. His tenure 
began with a Brezhnev-like attempt to cultivate a special relationship with the U.S. leaders. After 
the 9/11 attacks in New York, Putin offered the Bush administration cooperation in the war on 
terror. In the following decade, however, Putin became antagonized by the expansion of NATO 
and the European Union. He – and an increasingly large segment of Russian political elites - 
viewed Western assistance to “colour revolutions,” above all in Ukraine in 2005 and 2014, as the 
policy of encirclement of Russia with the U.S.-dependent states and clients. The Russian leader 
also concluded that if Russia retreated it would be doomed to occupy a subservient role. Putin’s 
goal is not to undermine the U.S.-led world order per se. It is beyond his capabilities, and, 
besides, Russia is embedded in this order. Rather, Putin’s actions since 2007 are aimed at 
checking growing American encroachments on ex-Soviet territory, where Russian economic and 
political interests remain very strong. As Russia has risen from its prostrate position, Moscow’s 
actions reflected are natural, considering Russian geography, history, and security interests. 
Therefore, Putin’s actions from 2007-2017 should be considered defensive, a reaction to the 
advancement of the U.S. zone of influence in Russia’s own backyard.  
Brezhnev sanctioned the invasion of Afghanistan after his advisers convinced him that 
the United States wanted to turn that country into American satellite. Today, Putin is quite 
content with US military presence in Afghanistan. Yet, for him, the U.S. pledge of 2008 to 
accept Ukraine and Georgia into NATO was a security threat that required a pre-emptive and 
harsh rebuff. American sanctions after the annexation of Crimea did not surprise him; he just 
concluded that the United States now wanted to topple his regime and push Russia back into the 
time of troubles. He responded by raising the stakes in Syria and by meddling in the U.S. 
presidential election. This resembles the risk-taking of Nikita Khrushchev more than the cautious 
Brezhnev.  
Russia looms large in the American security imagination, but the opposite is also true: the 
sizable part majority of Russian elites and public consider the United States as a threat to Russian 
statehood and security. On both sides, mutual insecurity becomes a matter of hysterical domestic 
politics, which precludes pragmatism and is laced with anger and fear. Against this background, 
Trump’s quest for a grand deal with Putin is naïve. Putin’s goals and Russian insecurity, as well 
as the American concept of world order, make such a deal improbable.  
At the same time, the United States should recognize that, however troubling Putin’s 
actions in Ukraine and Syria are, they still do not bear on vital U.S. or Western interests. 
Certainly, electoral meddling is a problem, yet American retaliation can only launch another tit-
for-tat cycle between the United States and Russia. American sanctions can hurt Russia, but they 
actually help Putin’s consolidation of power. Should sanctions tighten, the Russian leader would 
certainly retaliate, and in unpredictable and possibly more dangerous ways. U.S. leaders should 
not be tempted to exaggerate Putin’s vulnerabilities nor underestimate those of the United States. 
In comparison with Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, Putin holds weaker cards, but he is more 
flexible and cunning, and can exploit Western internal divisions, especially the anti-liberal 
movements. Putin’s propaganda tools far surpass those of Soviet propaganda. The Russian 
economy is smaller than Soviet economy, but more resilient and adapted to global capitalism.  
Some American analysts now believe that Putin’s problem will fade in the future, and 
that his actions will only leave Russia more isolated and weakened, just as Brezhnev’s invasion 
of Afghanistan had weakened the Soviet Union. Some observers even believe that after another 
period of confrontation the United States will emerge victorious again, just as it did in the 1980s. 
To draw these lessons from the past would be misleading. It is dangerous to expect that things 
with Russia will get better after they get worse. It is also wrong to assume that another arms race 
would force Putin’s Russia to succumb and yield to the American agenda. This did not happen 
during the Cold War, and there is no indication that this may occur today.  
Instead, responsible American leaders must not shut diplomatic channels to the Kremlin; 
they must remain ready to talk. There are a few things with regard to Russia that U.S. leaders can 
do better. First, they should educate the American public about the complexity of the U.S.-
Russian relations. Second, they must avoid escalating tensions further. Third, they should clearly 
abandon the rhetoric of regime change in Russia, rhetoric that could only provoke a dangerous 
Russian response. Fourth, they should refrain from inserting American military power directly 
and indirectly into the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and they should seek more ways to 
cooperate with Russia in Syria. Fifth, U.S. leaders should support transactional agreements of 
mutual interest with the Kremlin, such as in nuclear security, cyberwarfare, and measures against 
international terrorism.  
It was a great fluke that soon after Brezhnev’s death Mikhail Gorbachev came to power 
in the Soviet Union. It is unlikely to happen today in Russia. It is much more probable that 
Putin’s successors will continue to defend Russia’s interests against U.S. influence in the 
Russian near abroad. With this in mind, U.S. policy faces a strategic choice: either prepare for a 
regional geostrategic tug-of-war against Russia in its own geographical area or choose a more 
global approachmoderate course, a mixture of mild containment and engagement. The latter 
approach appears to be If the latter becomes the more prudent choice, as it, then U.S. policies 
towards Russia cannot be only punitive and vindictive; they cannot be fixated on Putin and the 
demonization of his power. takes into account the rise of China, the only real strategic challenge 
to the United States. The continuing confrontation with Putin is likely to induce Russia to side 
with China against US interests. Conversely, diplomatic dialogue and discussions of Russia’s 
role in Europe help to keep other options open. With this in mind, then U.S. policies towards 
Russia cannot be only punitive and vindictive; they cannot be fixated on Putin and the 
demonization of his power. Ultimately, Russia is going to remain as a crucial partner in the 
global order. U.S. leaders should strongly signal to the Kremlin that Russia’s legitimate interests 
in this order will be respected. 
 
